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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of consultants, professional service 
firms and knowledge intermediaries in articulating the collective action of shareholders. The 
regulatory background is the current proposals for the reform of General Meetings of 
Shareholders in Spain. General Meetings are particularly revealing of shareholder activism, 
as they are the forum in which shareholders’ actions can be most effective. We believe that 
our arguments are, to a very large extent, equally applicable to other European countries, as 
these proposals have been put forward in Spain within the context of the wider governance 
reforms promoted by the Winter Report in Europe and other national and supranational 




























THE INCREASING ROLE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS PLAY 







In the first months of 2005, there were reports in the Spanish business press of the 
launching of several associations for the defence of shareholders’ economic interests. While 
some of these associations were specific to particular large companies or sectors (most 
notably banking), others were open to minority shareholders of all companies or industries. 
Some of the reports revealed that the Executive Committees of these associations were led by 
lawyers who were partners of Madrid’s most prestigious law firms, with the backing of some 
well-known executives, many of them retired. It seemed, then, than most big firms had their 
own association. Often, that sponsorship was not clear in the press and had to be uncovered 
by further inquiry. 
 
The simultaneous public launching of these associations became so noteworthy that 
one of the most prestigious Spanish corporate governance experts published an article on the 
phenomenon in Expansión, the economic daily with the largest circulation (Trias Sagnier, 
March 23, 2005). Because of its interest, we reproduce here the first and last paragraphs of 
that article: 
 
The launching of associations for the defence of minority shareholders should be 
applauded, even if it is motivated more by the private interest of the associations’ 
promoters than by genuine concern for the interests of shareholders. After all, 
Reason used an ambitious, unscrupulous character such as Napoleon to expand the 
idea of freedom and tear down the barriers of ignorance. So we should not be 
alarmed if some professionals look after their own interests in this arena. In doing 
so, they may breathe fresh life into our system of corporate governance. The 
problem is precisely that they may be too blinkered in their pursuit of short-term 




Any initiative by third parties to favour these associations should be welcome, even 
if the motives of their promoters are less than altruistic. In fact, the same scheme has 
been working in other countries. So, this trend is no bad thing for the lethargic 
Spanish system of corporate governance. All the same, it is better to be transparent 
and call a spade a spade than to use the guise of shareholder associations to offer 




The author of this piece exposes the artificial nature of these associations while 
ultimately accepting their usefulness, with the argument of the beneficial public 
consequences of selfish private behaviour. That these associations are a front for legal 
consulting is obvious, yet they have a very interesting distinctive peculiarity: together with 
the strictly legal advice that they provide, they also claim to –indeed they have to– develop 
the collective will of minority shareholders. That makes them a new and unusual type of 
consulting venture. And what drives them to develop their practice in that direction is the 
very same circumstance that puts minority shareholders at the mercy of their agents: 
ownership dispersion. Ownership dispersion leads to a deficit of information and a deficit of 
social connections, posing almost insurmountable challenges for collective action. Those two 
deficits are linked: to compensate for a structural weakness in information, minority 
principals should act together, but their very dispersion makes collective action highly 
unlikely. They need help to become aware of common interests, develop the will to act, and 
detect and exploit action opportunities. That is what defines social movements. Associations 
in defence of minority shareholders claim to be the catalysts of those movements. Obviously, 
shareholders with large shareholdings do not need to engage in collective action in the same 
way, because most often they are composed of a very small number of individuals or even 
just one. The kind of consulting they need is mostly of the traditional legal kind. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of consultants, professional service 
firms and knowledge intermediaries in articulating the collective action of shareholders. The 
regulatory background is the current proposals for the reform of General Meetings of 
Shareholders in Spain. General Meetings are particularly revealing of shareholder activism, 
as they are the forum in which shareholders’ actions can be most effective. We believe that 
our arguments are, to a very large extent, equally applicable to other European countries, as 
these proposals have been put forward in Spain within the context of the wider governance 
reforms promoted by the Winter Report in Europe and other national and supranational 
regulatory efforts.  
 
General Meetings, and the attempts to reform them, are a clear illustration of a fact 
that applies equally to other institutions of governance: business and the economy are always 
a few steps ahead of, and invariably are more complex than, whatever legal mechanisms are 
in place to promote good corporate governance. Legal reforms, including quasi-legal 
professional regulations such as those based on good governance codes, may guarantee a 
certain minimum level of control; but good decision making, which is the essence of good 
governance, cannot be prescribed by law. As we will see, the consulting needed for active 




General Shareholders’ Meetings in Spain: the disconnect between the law and the real 
world 
 
Under Spanish law, the General Shareholders Meeting  is the forum for the 
expression of the will of the company’s owners. It is corporations’ supreme and sovereign 
body, and as such it has the power to alter the corporation’s bylaws and to appoint and 
remove directors. The General Meeting is defined as a meeting of shareholders, called in due 
form to deliberate and decide by majority on important company matters, to approve the 
annual accounts, and to appoint directors. It is not a standing body, but General Meetings are 
held at least once a year, in ordinary session, while Extraordinary General Meetings may be 
held at other times, subject to certain requirements. 
 
It is widely acknowledged by legal experts, management scholars and the business 
press that the legal definition is at odds with the way General Meetings actually work in 3 
 
 
practice. For instance, in large listed companies in Spain, the General Meeting has gradually 
become ineffectual and has de facto ceased to act as a sovereign assembly, even for the most 
important issues. In practice, it is no longer a forum for debate but essentially a formality 
required by law to rubber-stamp the decisions of the company’s Board, which in turn may be 
influenced by the top management, to a very varying and company-contingent degree. 
Accordingly, its decision-making function has become secondary and merely formal, and 
geared primarily towards confirming decisions that have already been taken. Also, over the 
years, the Annual General Meeting has turned into a mega-event held in a blaze of publicity, 
a show (Vives, 2005). External consultants specialized in media; communications and event 
organization are already involved in staging these corporate shows. And, so far, the vast 
majority of those consultants have been working for the same side: directors and executives 
(the agents), who are appointed not by the minority shareholders but by the control groups 
(the dominant principals). In Southern Europe, these dominant groups are often called the 
“hard core”. They reinforce their power in General Shareholders’ Meetings by profiting from 
the mostly unresolved challenge of democracy –political, corporate, any kind of democracy– 
when large groups come together, especially large uninformed groups, often at the mercy of 
closely knit, well organized minorities. 
 
Some Spanish authors writing on legal issues, such as Roncero Sánchez (1996), 
have openly acknowledged the problem as follows:  
 
The legal framework remains divorced from reality, particularly in large public 
companies whose shares are traded on the capital market [...] and whose shareholders consist 
mainly of investors holding a small share of the company’s equity, generally as part of a 
diversified portfolio, whose main concern is to earn a high return on their investment and 
who are uninterested in the company’s business. Consequently, the General Meeting does not 
in practice perform the role assigned to it by law. As a result, decision-making power is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of controlling shareholders and/or in the hands of 
the company’s administrators, who act basically without any supervision. 
 
It is surprising how long the current rules governing General Shareholders’ 
Meetings have remained unchanged, despite the overwhelming evidence that the real world is 
quite different from the legal fiction – and not precisely for the good of corporate 
governance. This is all the more unfortunate if we bear in mind that the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting ought to play a particularly important role in the internal or intra-
organizational governance systems typical of continental Europe and Japan, where large 
banks are the chief source of finance and also have significant shareholdings in the main 
industries. In these business systems it falls to the company’s internal bodies –the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting and the Board of Directors– to oversee the work of the company’s 
management. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon model of external controls based mainly on market 
control, they tend to feature a high concentration of share ownership, a high participation of 
banks in company ownership, and a slow rate of transfer of controlling interests. It is also 
common to have the representative of the controlling shareholders sitting on Boards of 
Directors. Clearly, therefore, the General Meeting has a vital role to play in corporate 
governance in Spain and other countries with analogous governance systems, as a balancing 
body of the often all-too-powerful dominant shareholder groups. In the Spanish context, as 
we already said, banks have traditionally been the main source of financing for large 
companies, and as a consequence the capital market system is still relatively small, in spite of 
the increasing presence of institutional investors in the past decade. Any reform proposal will 
naturally involve strengthening the participation of shareholders in the governance of 
companies through their representatives, in order to establish a balance within the structure of 




The General Meeting was completely absent from early discussions on corporate 
governance in Spain. What little attention it received in the corporate governance literature 
focused on isolated and highly technical aspects such as proxy voting or the information 
provided to shareholders. 
 
The debate on General Meetings did not really get under way in Spain until the 
publication, in 1998, of the Olivencia Code on the good governance of listed companies, and 
above all in 2002 under the influence of more demanding corporate governance legislation in 
the United States, the United Kingdom (Higgs Report), the EU (Winter Report), and the 
publication in Spain of the Aldama Report, which is part of a wider movement to reform 
corporate governance. 
 
The 1998 Olivencia Code launched the first phase of corporate governance reform in 
Spain. It questioned the effectiveness of certain policies designed to strengthen shareholder 
participation in the General Meeting, noting that “the capacity of the shareholders’ meeting 
of listed companies to act as a supervisory and decision-making body is subject to many 
structural limitations”. The pessimistic assumption of the Olivencia Code, and of similar 
codes in other European countries, that the supervisory role of the General Meeting could 
never be fully and effectively exercised, has been highly criticized by various authors. 
According to Alonso Ledesma (1999), this readiness to relinquish the authority of the 
General Meeting is particularly surprising in Spain, where company ownership is highly 
concentrated and there is good reason to strengthen the role of the General Meeting. It was 
precisely the recognition of the inability of the General Meeting to impose discipline that 
served to justify the Olivencia Code’s decision to sideline the General Meeting in favour of 
the Board of Directors as the leading supervisory body. 
  
The second wave of corporate governance reform in Spain, epitomized by the 
Aldama Report, officially published in January 2003 but whose results were already available 
at the end of 2002, likewise included numerous proposals to improve the effectiveness of 
Boards of Directors, although these were assumed to be insufficient and, as a consequence, 
the report also included proposals for the reform of the General Shareholders’ Meeting. The 
Aldama Report, unlike the Olivencia Code, maintained that one of the primary goals of 
corporate governance reform should be to reinforce the role of the General Meeting as “a 
vital decision-making and supervisory body for protecting the health of the company and the 
interests of the shareholders”. It proposed that listed companies should lay down rules of 
conduct for General Meetings, just as they do for the conduct of Boards of Directors. The 
procedures and powers of the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders should be subject to 
approval by that very same body as a subject of corporate sovereignty, and always with 
constituent powers. These regulations should cover: 
 
1.  Advance and public call of meetings, agenda, proposed resolutions and 
information to be made available to shareholders during the preparation 
period: 
 
•  General Meetings must be called with sufficient notice to allow 
shareholders to gather information or issue voting instructions. 
 
•  The text of any proposed resolutions and a statement of the purpose for 








2.  Proceedings at General Meetings: 
 
•  The Aldama Report recommended, but did not require, that mutual and 
investment funds, financial institutions and financial intermediaries, which 
increasingly represent large groups of individual shareholders or investors, 
should take a more active role in shaping the company’s decisions. 
Moreover, they should publicly state their intention to participate or not in 
the decisions of the companies in which they invest. 
 
•  The Regulations should contain rules governing the procedures of the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting, regarding chairmanship, information, 
Q&As, duration, order and number of speakers, attendance and 
participation of the external auditor and chairs of Board committees. 
 
•  Efforts should be made to standardize the documentation issued to 
shareholders to attend meetings. 
 
3.  The Report proposed, as a matter for self-regulation rather than for 
compulsory compliance, that companies should determine the procedures 
allowing the announcement and debate of proposals not the on the agenda 
drawn up by the Board, so that the Board of Directors may decide, state and 
justify its opinion as to whether the proposal should be included or not, 
justifying its decision if the proposal is rejected; and for introducing systems 
to calculate the quorum electronically. Other rules should deal with proxy 
voting, voting by mail or electronic voting, and other technical issues 
concerning the participation of “large numbers” in decision-making. 
 
The Securities and Stock Exchange Act of July 2003 made obligatory many of the 
measures just mentioned. The aim was to breathe new life into the General Meeting in listed 
companies and give it a new vitality. It also opened a huge opportunity for legal advisors, 
who jumped in to help companies comply with a wealth of complex new regulations. 
 
However, many of these regulations had a limited impact, as the case of Banco 
Santander Central Hispano, one of the largest banks in Europe and Latin America, illustrates. 
At the General Shareholders’ Meeting of Banco Santander Central Hispano held on June 21, 
2003 an interesting situation arose: the Board of Directors, following the recommendations of 
the Aldama Committee, included in the agenda, under item seven, a resolution to establish, 
precisely, a set of regulations for the General Meetings of the bank’s shareholders. At the 
same time, the representative of a recently formed association of minority shareholders put 
forward an alternative set of regulations. The main differences between the two sets of 
regulations were as follows: 
 
•  Adding items to the agenda: the regulations proposed by the shareholder 
association allowed shareholders holding a minimum number of shares to 
demand that new items be included on the agenda, after the call of the 
meeting, which the Board’s regulations did not allow. 
 
•  Shareholders’ right to address the meeting: the shareholder association’s 
proposed regulations followed parliamentary tradition in setting limits to 
speeches, which should be of a reasonable length, no more than half an 
hour, although the chairman of the meeting could authorize an extension if 
considered appropriate. The shareholder association’s regulations also 
included a five-minute right of reply by shareholders, with the chairman 
having the last word. In contrast, the regulations proposed by the Board of 6 
 
 
Directors allowed five minutes maximum for each speech, with the 
chairman having the option of granting a five-minute extension. No right 
of reply for shareholders was envisaged. 
 
In the end, the shareholder association’s alternative regulations were rejected, 
despite the fact that Banco Santander Central Hispano likes to present itself as one of the 
champions of corporate governance reform in Spain. 
 
Thus, the new regulations increase the demand for legal advice in several regards. 
Like any more detailed regulation of an economic or social phenomenon, it draws in lawyers, 
to deal with that increased legal complexity.  In the field of corporate governance, the new 
regulations of shareholder meetings come on top of regulations in accounting and 
transparency. So, for legal firms already advising the top management and Boards of 
corporations in the stock market –usually expensive, top notch, high-fee firms– these new 
regulations mean more business of a similar nature. Since the new rules also open up 
opportunities for litigation by minority shareholders, smaller, less prestigious and less 
expensive law firms make take on projects with a new angle: going against the corporate 
status quo. Even more, both types of law firms may go after a new type of client –
associations of shareholders, which are able to pay by pooling resources, paying higher fees– 
on condition that those law firms also act as social organizers of those interests, a new type of 
consulting activity that also includes the promotion of media impact of their class actions, 




Inadequacy of reforms of formal proceedings of General Meetings and reliance on 
social actors: shareholders and General Meeting activism 
 
Even the advocates of reforms of General Shareholders’ Meetings admit that such 
reforms will not be sufficient on their own. Some economic actors –e.g. minority 
shareholders– will need first of all to mobilize themselves to be able to restore the role of the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting as the highest functioning body of corporate governance. 
Trying to improve the various channels of participation in the General Meeting will have no 
effect if shareholders are unwilling to take an active role, or if it is taken for granted that all 
shareholders want to play an active role, which is not always the case. As in politics, in 
corporate governance there could be a “silent majority”. Hence the need to distinguish 
between different types of shareholders: depending on their capabilities for activism, whether 
they are individual, institutional or significant shareholders, etc. 
 
•  Individual shareholders: These are individual investors who have acquired 
shares in different companies. Also known as minority shareholders, 
because of the small size of their holdings and dispersion, they need self- 
awareness, political organization, knowledge of rights and interests, and 
persistence of action. This activism cannot be enacted without the 
intervention of an agent as social organizer (Tarrow, 1994). 
 
•  Significant shareholders: Normally companies or institutions that hold a 
significant proportion of the company’s shares on a long-term basis, with 
the intention of supervising and having a say in shaping the policies 
pursued by the companies in which they have invested. In Spain, they tend 
to be banks or large industrial groups. Because they most often have seats 
on the Boards, they can act on their own, and have the capability to form 
alliances with other significant shareholders and act in unison. They just 
need more of the same type of external or even internal legal advice. And 7 
 
 
they do not need external help to organize themselves. That is easy for 
them, because of their small numbers and experience. They have the 
advantages elites have. 
 
•  Institutional shareholders: These are organizations whose business 
involves trading in the securities market. They include mutual funds and 
investment trusts, pension funds and insurance companies, securities 
firms, banks and credit institutions. They have access to a large volume of 
funds, which they diversify in different securities in order to ensure the 
highest possible return for their clients. Institutional shareholders are 
assumed to have more investment expertise than individual shareholders. 
The size of their shareholdings and their professional acumen allow them 
to put more pressure on the management team. However, their focus on 
margin makes it expensive for them to exercise “voice”, and so they rather 
prefer the solution of “exit” (Garrido, 2002; Pozen, 1994). 
 
Another way of classifying shareholders is according to their motivation towards 
activism, whether they are active or passive. The purpose of this distinction, far from 
discriminating among investors, is to acknowledge each shareholder’s differentiated 
contribution to the long-term welfare of the corporation, based on their legitimate interests. 
Active shareholders constitute a “monitoring group” and may, if they act in concert, exercise 
a more direct influence over the company’s management. However, voices have been raised 
warning of the risk of conflicts of interest that may affect such monitoring activities by active 
shareholders. That is why in Spain, for instance, the Aldama Report recommends that 
companies should make public, in an annual good governance report, all information about 
commercial relations or other situations in which directors or major shareholders are involved 
and that the Board of Directors has considered non-controversial or a benefit for the 
company. 
 
Passive shareholders, in contrast, see the company as no more than a transitory,  
low-commitment investment opportunity and have no desire, and sometimes no capacity, to 
exercise any more direct control over company management beyond the simple “exit” option. 
The norm in the Spanish securities market is for companies to issue ordinary shares that carry 
certain financial, voting and other non-financial rights, including the right to attend General 
Meetings and vote on resolutions. The problem is what to do about passive shareholders who 
by law are also owners and have rights that they do not intend to exercise, and in practice 
never do, thus creating the opportunity for a power play to secure their proxy votes. While 
voters in a political system cannot, at least not easily, leave that system (emigration being one 
possibility), it is much easier for shareholders to leave a corporation and invest in another 
business opportunity. The easiness of exit is one of the main differences between corporate 
and political democracies. 
 
The importance of the distinction between passive and active shareholders requires 
criteria for differentiation. Relevant parameters for activism may include: 
 
 
Ownership of a significant percentage of the company’s shares 
 
As the size of an investor’s investment increases, the difficulty of disinvesting may 
also go up and investors are therefore likely to tend towards a more active attitude. On this 
basis, ownership of a significant percentage of a company’s shares could be regarded as a 





Maintaining the investment for a certain period of time 
 
The fact of holding shares for a certain length of time could be taken as a sign that 
the investor is interested in becoming involved in the company, given the stability and 
constancy of a medium to long-term investment as opposed to a speculative short-term 
investment. 
 
Also, the stability of the investment may indicate the strength of the investor’s desire 
to supervise the company’s management, so as to ensure a satisfactory return and prevent 
substantial changes that could put his investment at risk. 
 
 
A declaration of intentions on investment policies 
 
Another criterion that might help to measure the extent of an investor’s willingness 
to participate would be an explicit declaration by the investor of its investment policy. The 
Aldama Report recommended that investment trusts, financial institutions and intermediaries 
publish a statement, as is standard practice in the United States, setting out their policies with 
regard to participation in the company’s decisions, thus making a more active contribution to 
governing the company and assuming a more participative role. 
 
This recommendation, by encouraging investors to declare a policy of active 
participation in the company, is intended to discourage the “hands-off” attitude of some 
investors, who feel free to invest or disinvest whenever it suits them. However, it seems 
unlikely that much progress will be made in that direction in Spain or continental Europe as a 
whole. Merely drafting such declarations is a financially and legally risky exercise that 
investors will shy away from, and that in any case is costly and will demand much legal 
consulting (Garrido, 2002). 
 
 
Regular exercise of rights with respect to General Meetings (attendance and voting) for a 
certain period 
 
Whether a shareholder exercises his rights or not is another criterion for assessing 
his role. Failure to exercise the right to attend and vote in General Meetings, either in person 
or by proxy, for a certain period may be construed as a sign that the investor is unwilling to 
participate. 
 
Attending and voting in General Meetings is time-consuming and will only be 
efficient from the investor’s point of view if it has a favourable impact on his earnings. A 
shareholder’s supervisory role is closely linked to expected earnings, so the greater the 
expected earnings, the more willing the shareholder is likely to be to shoulder the costs of 
supervision, including consulting fees. 
 
Companies treat each type of shareholder differently. Listed companies have tended 
to give priority to significant and institutional shareholders over individual shareholders. This 
difference is reflected in the way, in true contingency-theory fashion, differentiated structures 
or units are set up to deal with different shareholders separately. Thus, Investor Relations 
departments tend to oversee intense and continuous relations with institutional and significant 
shareholders, while Shareholder Service offices, much more in a public relations mood, 
handle relations, often discontinuous and more superficial, with minority shareholders. 
 
Institutional and significant shareholders have traditionally received preferential 
treatment, which is reflected in the quantity and quality of the information they receive. In 9 
 
 
Spain, as in other countries, meetings or presentations by top management to analysts and 
investment funds, the so-called “road shows”, are quite common. 
 
On the other hand, communicating with small shareholders is much more difficult, 
because of their sheer numbers. A wide range of tools is available to recruit and retain 
minority shareholders, including magazines or newsletters, shareholder clubs, bonuses and 
prizes, free gifts in the run-up to General Meetings, even the offering of the company’s 
products to shareholders at special prices. These are a whole variety of potential activities, to 
be provided by another whole variety of experts. 
 
Respect for shareholders’ right to information is crucial to build confidence in the 
capital markets. Disclosure and transparency is particularly important in corporate 
governance, above all in connection with General Shareholders’ Meetings, as it can be a 
means of encouraging greater shareholder participation. That is why the reforms in Spain 
have tried to establish mechanisms to ensure that companies fulfil their duty to inform their 
shareholders. This duty is particularly strict in the stock market, where listed companies must 
meet certain minimum security and liquidity requirements, combined with information 
transparency. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the different treatment given to the different types of 
shareholders has traditionally been reflected in the information they receive. The tendency 
today, however, particularly with respect to disclosure, is for a more uniform treatment, 
facilitated by the new technologies. As the Aldama Report suggests, corporate web sites can 
be a channel (though with no guarantee of effectiveness) for informing and interacting with 
shareholders, offering fresh content and communication tools (chat rooms, e-mail, user 
registration, mobile Internet). The Aldama Report also gives a list of the information that 
companies should publish on their web sites, as a basic minimum, which includes the rules 
governing General Meetings, the stable shareholdings held by different shareholders, 
directors’ shareholdings, and details about the General Meeting. 
 
However, all these reforms do not go so far as to directly help dispersed minority 
shareholders to organize their collective action. That is left to them; they are on their own. 
That is the void, and the need, that associations of shareholders sponsored by professional 




The role of institutional investors 
 
Despite the regulatory reforms and other formal proposals concerning the holding of 
General Meetings, the regulators in Spain, as in other countries, have recognized the need to 
recruit the efforts of other social actors, other than the formal institutions of corporate 
governance, to help improve corporate governance practices. Specifically, it has turned to 
institutional investors to fill this role. Institutional investors are increasingly well represented 
among the shareholders of Spanish companies, as the extensive study by Trias Sagnier (1998) 
shows. Traditionally, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, public companies have gone to the stock 
market to raise capital, whereas in continental Europe the main providers of capital for large 
listed companies have been the banks. Whereas in the United States and the United Kingdom 
institutional investors hold more than 50% of all listed shares, in Spain and other countries in 
Europe the proportion is smaller. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s institutional investors 
have become more important in Spain, partly due to foreign investment, which is largely 
institutional. For instance, foreign institutional investors currently own more than one third of 
Spanish shares. Foreign investors have traditionally maintained a hands-off attitude towards 10 
 
 
company management. In fact, the most significant characteristic of foreign investors is said 
to be their absenteeism and lack of participation. 
 
Although institutional investors have traditionally shown no interest in exercising 
the influence that in theory they could have, given the size of their shareholdings, there have 
been a few instances recently where they have shown signs of activism. A striking example 
was in 1999, when for the first time ever in Spain a group of institutional investors that 
included Société Générale and Beta Capital called for the resignation of the Board of 
Directors of the company Duro Felguera because they were dissatisfied with its stewardship. 
Their example has been followed by others such as Union Investment and DWS Investment 
of Germany, which at the last meeting of Telefónica shareholders declared that they were not 
interested in the distribution of 30% of the shares of the Spanish television channel Antena 3 
TV in the form of a special dividend. The General Meeting of Shareholders is becoming the 
preferred channel of shareholder participation, as an alternative to the more direct 
involvement that comes with Board membership, or with direct influence channels, such as 
those exemplified by the road shows (Vives, 2005). 
 
Given the increasing importance of foreign investment in Spain, the question arises 
of how foreign shareholders can exercise their right to attend and vote at General Meetings. 
This brings us to the complex issue of cross-border voting, which has been analysed in 
several country comparative studies. A report published in 2002 entitled “Cross Border Proxy 
Voting”, published under the aegis of the International Corporate Governance Network, 
analysed issues relating to proxy voting and attendance at General Meetings in five different 
countries: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Japan. 
 
As already mentioned, the shareholder structure of listed companies in Spain 
includes a contingent of significant shareholders, though institutional investors have been 
gaining in importance. This trend is most apparent in Spanish banks, such as the BBVA 
group, 44.1% of whose shares are owned by institutional investors, or the BSCH group, with 
56.11% of its shares in institutional hands. 
 
Could institutional investors be the drivers of a revitalization of the General Meeting 
as a governing body? The growth and consolidation of institutional investment in Spain has 
drawn attention to these investors’ traditional absenteeism. Unlike in the United States, where 
pension fund managers are required by law to exercise their right to vote in all the companies 
in which they own shares, in Spanish law there is as yet no obligation for institutional 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights. This is a relatively recent issue in Spain and it 
remains to be seen how it develops in the light of future changes in the law aimed at 




What is left for small shareholders? 
 
The small investor seems to be left with few options to contribute to the 
improvement of corporate governance. The reforms in many countries fall short of really 
empowering shareholders so that they have the instruments to effectively control governance 
bodies. There has been an increase in transparency, more information is being provided 
through corporate websites, and most corporations even have a specialized unit to deal with 
shareholders interests. But the impact is still minimal. 
 
In continental European countries, where ownership is quite concentrated, we have 
seen that controlling blocks and institutional investors are not always the keepers of 
shareholders’ interests. An extensive “democratization of ownership” may surely change 11 
 
 
things as the market for corporate control can get more important. Steps ahead have already 
been made in countries like Spain, but they do not seem to be very definitive, as the stock 
exchange returns receded and money flowed very fast towards real estate again. 
 
It is at least a curiosity to observe that the democratization of ownership has not yet 
developed into a real democratization of governance structures. The key question, then, is 
whether we can come up with ways to give shareholders voice and participation. We have 
seen that current General Shareholders’ Meetings are not fully effective for that purpose. As 
indicated, there are some possibilities for improvement; for instance, technology plays an 
important role here, as it drastically facilitates the necessary information transparency, which 
is fundamental in order to move forward in this respect. Another step ahead, if only a small 
one, might be the creation of a Board committee to establish a dialogue with minority 
stakeholders. In the complex world we live in, we have no doubt that corporations could 
learn a lot from such interaction, difficult though it may be. In any case, we would at least get 
a more informed shareholder. 
 
Also, it might be possible to establish some direct means of participation, such as 
electronic voting, or even direct voting on certain specific decisions. Some companies are 
already trying to implement electronic voting, but mostly as a way to support current 
governance. 
 
If we establish an analogy with political systems, we can see that information –via 
the Internet, the media or both– and voting procedures are important instruments, but they are 
not enough. The voter is still too small, too far away to have any real impact. Democracy will 
require some way of organizing the different views through different types of shareholder 
associations. And we have seen some “interested” associations. However, it is still difficult to 
imagine small investors trying to organize when they can simply sell the stock. Firms may 
eventually get a lot from listening to small shareholders, but most CEOs have no interest in 
doing so. And government is unlikely to start financing associations of small investors when 







The main proposals of the Aldama Report, as in most continental European 
corporate governance reform efforts, summed up in this paper, are aimed at giving the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting a more useful role in corporate governance. It remains to be 
seen whether the adoption of these recommendations by listed companies and institutional 
shareholders becomes just another formality, given that the existing power structure of the 
General Meeting and Board of Directors and the custom of holding purely formal, “rubber-
stamp” General Shareholders’ Meetings are deeply ingrained in Spanish business culture. 
Similarly, investment funds are accustomed to pursuing a flexible and independent approach 
to portfolio management, without any involvement in company affairs beyond what is strictly 
necessary to administer their assets. 
 
To make the General Shareholders’ Meeting an effective governing body with 
deliberative and decision-making power, a new format will need to be found, nothing like the 
overblown media spectacle to which we are accustomed. Shareholder associations and 
groupings of institutional investors may have a prominent role to play in this respect. Also, 
the new technologies may bring major changes to the existing system with the introduction of 
electronic voting. Other proposals might include setting up a shareholder committee, on an 12 
 
 
analogy with the various other committees of the Board of Directors, but made up of 
shareholders representing the entire body of shareholders on a proportional basis. 
 
All these changes are aimed above all at making the General Shareholders’ Meeting 
a more effective supervisory body. They are unlikely, however, to bring any substantial 
improvement to its strategic, decision-making function. There is even a danger that reforms 
based on stricter control and regulation of governance procedures will end up making the 
decision-making process more rigid. This is the old problem of direct or participatory 
democracy. Forcing it deteriorates its very essence. Laziness in participation is a democratic 
right. This is even truer in business polities, where exit is often much easier than from 
countries.  
 
To avoid this risk, the active presence of knowledge workers or professional service 
firms, such as consultants, seems important. Throughout this piece we have identified several 
types of them, some already present in the field, who because of the new regulations will 
have more business. They include media, communication and public relations experts, so far 
working mostly for the status quo of corporate governance. Of course, in the same group are 
lawyers specialized in corporate law, now with a new client to add to their traditional 
portfolio (Boards, chief executives, etc.): institutional investors, and perhaps also individual 
investors with substantial personal assets. 
 
And a new client is emerging, disenfranchised shareholders, who legally, 
economically, and socially need to act collectively to efficiently pursue their interests. The 
same reasons –lack of information, coupled with isolation– that make these principals 
candidates for being exploited by their agents require that the experts helping them perform 
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